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ABSTRACT: This article describes existing child support practice in the
United States, giving attention to the establishment and enforcement of
parental child support obligations as well as to publicly provided child
support benefits. Effects of the current system on alleviating poverty are
assessed. The article addresses several questions. Should low-income ab-
sent parents be excused from the obligation to support their children? Can
child support provide more generous benefits to single-parent families
while minimizing incentives for the formation of single-parent families?
Should children in single-parent families be aided by a welfare program?
What are the problems with the current child support system? Finally, a
proposal for a new child support insurance system is described, along with
estimates of the costs of the system and its effects on poverty and welfare
dependence. The relationship of estimated benefits to costs is promising
enough to warrant trying out the new system in selected jurisdictions.
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T HE economic well-being of a largeand growing percentage of chil-
dren in the United States is partly de-
pendent upon the nature of our child
support institutions.
As of 1981 approximately one of five
children in the United States were poten-
tially eligible for child support in that
they were residing apart from a living
natural parent.’ Nearly one of every two
children born today will become eligible
for child support before reaching age
18.2 Presently the majority of children
potentially eligible for child support live
in families headed by women. Approxi-
mately half of all children in female-
headed families are poor. These children
and their mothers constitute 30 percent
of the poor.4 Consequently the role of
child support in antipoverty policy is
important.
EXISTING PRACTICES
The current child support system
consists of two major parts: the judi-
ciary system, which now establishes the
responsibility to pay support, sets the
amount of support to be paid, and
enforces the obligation of parents to pay
support; and the Aid to Families with
Dependent Children program (AFDC),
commonly called welfare. There are
many other parts to this system. District
attorneys and jails have very big roles in
the lives of some absent parents. Food
stamps, Medicaid, and public housing
play a large part in the lives of most
AFDC beneficiaries.
The judicial system
The first point to make about child
support is that with the important excep-
tion of the recent federal enforcement
legislation discussed later in this section,
child support is strictly a state and local
function. Family law is traditionally a
province of the states.
In most states, the obligation of ab-
sent parents to pay child support is
explicitly stated in statute, although in
some states the obligation is only implied.’ 5
Even where the statutes contain guide-
lines as to how much support should be
paid, the guidelines are very general.
For example, in Wisconsin the statute
instructs courts to apply the following
criteria in determining the amount of
child support:
-the financial resources of the child;
-the financial resources of both
parents;
-the standard of living the child
would have enjoyed had the mar-
riage not ended in annulment, di-
vorce, or legal separation;
-the desirability that the custodian
remain in the home as a full-time
parent;
1. For an explanation of how this estimate
was derived, see Irwin Garfinkel and Marygold
Melli, Child Support: Weaknesses of the Old and
Features of a Proposed New System (Madison,
WI: Institute for Research on Poverty, 1982), vol.
1, fn. 1.
2. See the statistical appendix in Daniel
Patrick Moynihan, "Welfare Reform’s 1971-72
Defeat: A Historic Loss," Journal of the Institute
for Socioeconomic Studies, 6:1-20 (Spring 1981).
His estimate applies to children living in single-
parent families. Since some of these families result
from widowhood, the percentage eligible for child
support will be smaller.
3. In Wisconsin, 16 percent of children eli-
gible for support live with their fathers, 24 percent
live with their mothers and stepfathers, and 60
percent live in female-headed households.
4. See U.S., Department of Commerce, Bu-
reau of the Census, Characteristics of the Popula-
tion below the Poverty Level: 1980, Current
Population Reports, ser. P-60, no. 133 (Washing-
ton, DC: Government Printing Office, 1982), tab.
11.
5. Harry O. Krause, Child Support in Amer-
ica : The Legal Prospective (Charlottesville, VA:
Michie, 1981).
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-the cost of day care if the custodian
works outside the home, or the
value of custodial services per-
formed by the custodian if the
custodian remains in the home;
-the physical and emotional health
needs of the child;
-the child’s educational needs;
-the tax consequences to each party;
-such other factors as the court may
in each individual case determine
to be relevant.
In short, the system is characterized by
judicial discretion.
Judges in some jurisdictions use a
child support obligation schedule, which
is similar to a tax table. For example,
nearly every county in Michigan uses a
schedule in which the absent parent’s
obligation depends only upon his income
and the number of children he is re-
quired to support . But such child sup-
port schedules are the exception rather
than the rule.
In general, in order to collect overdue
child support, the custodial parent not
on welfare must take the initiative,
usually by bringing a civil contempt
charge against the nonpaying parent.
The custodial parent can get a judgment
for a sum of money that puts her in the
position of being a creditor, with various
avenues open to her that are open to all
creditors, such as garnishment of wages
and seizure of property.
In a few states, such as Michigan and
Wisconsin, a government agency has the
authority to initiate legal action when
child support obligations are not met.
The Michigan Friend of the Court,
founded in 1917, is the oldest such
agency. Still, except for welfare cases, in
which the state rather than the custodial
parent gets the proceeds from child
support collections, these government
agencies usually do not use this authori-
ty unless specifically requested to do so
by the custodial parent. In most cases,
the burden of collecting overdue sup-
port falls on the custodial parent.
Jail is the ultimate sanction for those
who do not pay. Thousands of absent
fathers are jailed each year in Michigan
for failure to comply with child support
orders.’ There are no data on the preva-
lence of jailing elsewhere. According to
Chambers, jailing works. That is, when
combined with an effective monitoring
system, it deters nonpayment. His conclu-
sion is based on the strong association
between payment performance and utili-
zation of jails across counties in Michigan.
A final point to note is that only a small
minority of absent fathers who fail to
pay child support are jailed.
The most effective child support
enforcement tool is a wage assignment.’
A wage assignment is a legal order to the
employer of the child support obligor to
withhold a specified amount from the
employee’s wages. Wage assignments
are being used more frequently. Wis-
consin law now requires that a contin-
gent wage assignment be issued in all
cases. The county clerk of courts to
whom all child support payments are
made has the legal authority to effect the
wage assignment once child support
payments are 20 days delinquent. In
practice, however, the clerk of courts
does not pursue delinquencies in welfare
cases for three to four months. More-
over, this agency takes no initiative in
nonwelfare cases.
The overall performance of the child
support system is, to say the least, not
6. David L. Chambers, Making Fathers Pay:
The Enforcement of Child Support (Chicago: U ni-
versity of Chicago Press, 1979).
7. Ibid., p. 248.
8. Ibid., pp. 90-104.
9. See Krause, Child Support in America;
and Chambers, Making Fathers Pay.
122
very impressive. Of those women with
children potentially eligible for child
support in 1979, only 59 percent were
awarded payments.1O For divorced and
remarried women, nearly 80 percent had
awards, while among separated and
never-married women, the figures were
45 percent and 11 percent, respectively.
Of those awarded support, only 49 per-
cent received the full amount due them
and 28 percent received nothing. Com-
bining the 40 percent who were entitled
to nothing with the 28 percent who,
although entitled, still received nothing
results in more than half of those poten-
tially eligible for child support getting
nothing. Only 11 percent of the absent
fathers of AFDC children pay any child
support. 11
The AFDC system
The AFDC program was created by
the landmark 1935 Social Security Act.
Eligible dependent children included
those who lost the earnings of a parent
because of death, disability, or absence.
In 1961, states were also permitted to
provide aid to dependent children whose
fathers were unemployed. Originally the
program paid benefits only to children,
but in 1950 the program was amended to
include benefits for the custodial parent.
When the program was enacted, most of
the children who benefited were or-
phans. Now the overwhelming majority
of the children’s mothers are divorced or
separated or have never married. Widows
constitute less than 2 percent of the
AFDC case load.
AFDC is an income-tested, or wel-
fare, program. That is, benefits are
confined to those with low income. As a
consequence benefit reduction rates-
tax rates-are high. Prior to 1967, most
states reduced benefits by a dollar for
each dollar earned. In 1967, in order to
promote work, Congress required states
to ignore the first $30 per month plus
one-third of each additional dollar
earned when calculating benefits. In
1982 at President Reagan’s request, the
Congress limited this work incentive to
the first four months. After that, bene-
fits are to be reduced again by a dollar
for each dollar of earnings.
Although the AFDC program has
been at the heart of the welfare reform
controversy, AFDC expenditures-$12.7
billion in fiscal year 1981-account for
only 17 percent of total welfare expendi-
tures and only 4 percent of total expendi-
tures on income support.’2
On the other hand, AFDC is the most
important public program for children
with living absent parents. In 1981, it
paid benefits to 11 million custodial
parents and children, most of whom
were potentially eligible for child sup-
port. Most AFDC families also receive
food stamps and Medicaid assistance in
addition to cash benefits. When all
welfare programs are included, probably
about half of all welfare expenditures go




As noted earlier, in 1935 most single
mothers were widows. As the nature of
10. U.S., Department of Commerce, Bureau
of the Census, Child Support and Alimony: 1978,
Current Population Reports, ser. P-23, no. 112
(Washington, DC: Government Printing Office,
1981).
11. Child Support Enforcement (Washington,
DC: Department of Health and Human Services,
Office of Child Support Enforcement, 1983), tabs.
10 and 19, pp. 18 and 28.
12. Irwin Garfinkel, ed., Income-Tested Trans-
fer Programs: The Case For and Against (New
York: Academic Press, 1982), p. 12.
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the case load shifted in response to the
demographic trends of more divorce,
separation, desertion, and out-of-wed-
lock births, congressional interest in
absent fathers grew. Congress enacted
the first federal child support legislation
in 1950, requiring state welfare agencies
to notify law enforcement officials when
a child receiving AFDC benefits had
been deserted or abandoned. Further
legislation, enacted in 1965 and 1967,
allowed states to request addresses of
absent parents from the Department of
Health, Education, and Welfare and the
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and
required states to establish a single organ-
izational unit to enforce child support
and establish paternity.
In 1975 Congress added Part D to
Title IV of the Social Security Act,
establishing the Child Support Enforce-
ment program, sometime referred to as
the IV-D program. The states are respon-
sible for running the program. They are
reimbursed by the federal government
for 75 percent of their costs. In 1980 the
law was amended so that the federal
government would provide 90 percent
of the funding for computerizing the
program. The IV-D program is supposed
to serve nonwelfare as well as welfare
cases. As of 1981 about 17 percent of the
IV-D case load was attributable to non-
AFDC cases.
The 1975 law authorized use of the
IRS to collect child support owed to
AFDC beneficiaries. In 1980 use of the
IRS extended to non-AFDC families.
In 1981, legislation required the IRS to
withhold tax refunds when individuals
owed child support that was past due.
By fiscal year 1982, IV-D collections
amounted to $1.8 billion.13 Despite the
fact that the IV-D program had an
average non-AFDC case load of 1.5
million compared to an average monthly
AFDC caseload of 5.5 million, collec-
tions for the non-AFDC case load totaled
$1.0 billion compared to $0.8 billion for
the AFDC case load.
The current effect of
child support on poverty
Although children living in female-
headed households are but a subset of
all children potentially eligible for child
support, our discussion focuses on them
because even in the absence of child
support, children living in male-headed
households are unlikely to be poor.’° In
1978, 51 percent of female-headed fami-
lies would have been poor in the absence
of private and public child support
transfers.&dquo; The gap between their
income and the income required to lift
them out of poverty was $9.1 billion.
Child support from absent parents re-
duced the percentage of female-headed
households that were poor to 47 and
reduced the poverty gap to $8.0 billion.
AFDC and other cash transfers reduced
this percentage to 42 and the poverty
gap to $3.8 billion. Smeeding’s estimates
indicate that in-kind transfers further
reduce poverty among female heads of
families by 16 to 49 percent, depending
13. Child Support Enforcement, pp. 2, 4, 18,
and 19.
14. The biggest omitted group live with their
remarried mothers. Only 5 percent of those
mothers live in households with incomes below the
poverty line. See Bureau of the Census, Child
Support and Alimony: 1978, tab. 1.
15. These and other figures in the same para-
graph in the text are taken from cross-tabulations
I produced from the 1979 Current Population
Survey (CPS) Mar.-Apr. match tape. A special
child support supplement was conducted in the
Apr. CPS and matched to the Mar. CPS. See
Bureau of the Census, Child Support and Ali-
mony : 1978 for a description of the data.
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upon which in-kind transfers are counted
and how they are valued.’6
These data give rise to two questions.
First, is the current division between
private and public child support transfers
appropriate with respect to poverty reduc-
tion ? Second, in what ways can the child
support system be altered to increase its




In its present operation the child
support system follows the line of least
resistance in dealing with a number of
important moral and economic issues
that require an informed consensus.
Among these are the questions of wheth-
er absent parents who have low incomes
should be required to pay child support,
how much child support absent parents
should be expected to pay, whether
single-parent families should be treated
differently from intact families, and whe-
ther welfare is the most appropriate way
to aid poor children.
Should low-income absent parents
be required to pay child support?
A fundamental principle that is consis-
tent with current law and common belief
and underlies both our evaluation of the
current child support system and our
efforts to reform the system is that when
an individual parents a child, that individ-
ual incurs an obligation to share his or
her income with the child. Yet most
absent parents and the overwhelming
majority of absent parents with low
income pay no child support. Are there
good reasons for exempting low-income
absent parents from the obligation to
pay child support? Two arguments have
been advanced for doing so.
First, there is the argument that low-
income absent fathers cannot afford to
pay child support. Many are unemployed.
Many remarry. Enforcing support will
only impoverish and pauperize the new
family as well as the old.
The best data indicate that the
average income in 1980 of an absent
father with a child receiving AFDC in
Wisconsin was nearly $11,000.&dquo; Clearly,
absent-parent income is nonnegligible.
A second question is, How much of
the absent father’s income should be
transferred to his children? Should some
of his income be set aside for his own
living expenses? Should additional funds
be set aside for a new wife and children?
If so, how much? Those who argue that
most absent fathers of welfare children
cannot afford to pay child support be-
lieve that the absent father should not be
required to pay any support until his
income is high enough to provide a
relatively decent standard for himself
and a new family. According to the
standards developed by the Community
Council of New York, absent fathers
need income close to the median level of
income to be able to afford to pay child
support. 18
In contrast, under a standard de-
veloped by the Wisconsin Department
of Health and Social Services (DHSS),
16. See Timothy Smeeding, Alternative Me-
thodsfor Valuing Selected In-Kind Transfer Bene-
fits and Measuring Their Effects on Poverty,
Technical Paper no. 50 (Washington, DC: Depart-
ment of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, 1982),
p. 89.
17. See Thomas McDonald, James Moran,
and Irwin Garfinkel, Wisconsin Study of Absent
Fathers’ Ability to Pay Child Support, Institute
for Research on Poverty Special Report no. 34
(Madison, WI: Institute for Research on Poverty,
1983).
18. See Guide for Determining the Ability of
an Absent Parent to Pay Child Support (New
York: Community Council of Greater New York,
1981).
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noncustodial fathers should pay 17 per-
cent of their income to support one
child, 25 percent to support two children,
29 percent, 31 percent, 32 percent, and
33 percent for three, four, five, and six
or more children, respectively. If absent
fathers of AFDC children paid child
support according to the Wisconsin DHSS
standard, their total contribution to
child support would be $5.1 billion.
Although many fewer absent fathers
would pay anything under the Com-
munity Council of New York’s guide-
lines, those who paid would pay much
more than under the Wisconsin DHSS
formula and, based on results for Wis-
consin, the aggregate amount paid would
be higher than $5.1 billion.’9 Both fig-
ures should be contrasted with the $0.7
billion currently collected.
The second argument for exempting
low-income absent fathers from paying
child support is that the costs of col-
lecting the payment are too high. For
the United States as a whole, the ratio of
AFDC child support collections to collec-
tion costs is only $1.30 to $1.00. More-
over in 22 states, costs exceed collection. 20
The record of the existing system is
hardly promising. If one believes strongly
enough in enforcing parental responsi-
bility, one can always make a case that
even if costs exceed collections, the
extra costs are justified. Few, however,
are so fervently committed. Indeed, most
of us would expect to do a good bit
better than spending $1.00 to raise $1.30.
Consequently, unless the system can be
made far more efficient than it is cur-
rently, there may be some justification
for excusing low-income absent fathers
from the obligation to pay child support.
Two historical experiences suggest
that automatic universal wage with-
holding of child support obligations
might make the collection of child sup-
port from low-income absent fathers
sufficiently efficient to justify the effort.
First, until the enactment of the Social
Security payroll withholding tax, income
tax experts believed that it was impossi-
ble to collect from low-income families.
Second, current experience with wage
withholding in child support is very
promising.
Child support as a resolution
to the dilemma of categories
In the previous section, some argu-
ments for excusing low-income absent
parents from the obligation to pay child
support were considered. In this section,
an argument is advanced that enforcing
the child support obligations helps re-
solve a dilemma of categorization in
income support systems. Categorization
consists of treating different groups dif-
ferently, for example, treating one-parent
families differently from two-parent
families.
The general case for categories is that
their use improves the trade-off between
adequacy and cost.2’ If some groups are
more likely than other groups to be
poor, the costs of forgoing categori-
zation are high. Either the benefits pro-
vided to all are high enough for the
group with the greatest needs, in which
case the system will be quite expensive,
or the benefits, although sufficient for
those with the fewest needs, are insuf-19. See Donald T. Oellerich, The Effects of
Potential Child Support Transfers on Wisconsin
AFDC Costs, Caseloads and Recipient Well-
Being, Institute for Research on Poverty Special
Report no. 35 (Madison, WI: Institute for Research
on Poverty, 1984) p. 140.
20. Child Support Enforcement, p. 83.
21. See G. A. Akerlof, "The Economics of
Tagging," American Economic Review, 68:8-19
(Mar. 1978); and Alton Linford, "Public Assistance
Categories: Yes or No?" Social Service Review,
22:199-210 (June 1948).
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ficient for those with the greatest needs.
The general problem with categories is
that they create incentives for people to
change their behavior in order to fit into
the more favored category.
The rationale for providing more aid
to single-parent than to two-parent
families is that the gap between needs
and the ability to meet those needs is
greater in single-parent families. In such
families there is only one adult capable
of generating income, caring for the
children, and doing housework. Further-
more, in the overwhelming majority of
cases, the single parent is a woman and
therefore is paid much less than a man
with comparable years of schooling. In a
study Robert Haveman and I conducted,
we found that female-headed families
were just as likely to be poor if families
were ranked by their earnings capacity-
ability to generate income if the adults
worked full-time all year-as by actual
income.22
The problem with providing more aid
to single-parent families is that doing so
creates incentives for the formation and
preservation of single-parent families.
Although several research studies have
found a positive correlation between the
level of AFDC benefits and the preva-
lence of female headship in the United
States, other studies find no effect. Taken
together these studies suggest that the
effect is probably weak.23 The strongest
effect of AFDC benefits appears to be
discouragement or delay of remarriage.
Of course, it is possible that society is
better off-or at least not worse off-as
a result of whatever additional single-
parent families are created by more
favorable treatment of those groups.
Not all marriages are made in heaven.
Some men beat their wives and children.
In some of these cases, all the parties
may be better off separate rather than
together. Although the most reliable
research indicates that boys who grow
up in single-parent families do less well
than boys who grow up in two-parent
families, this research may not be a good
guide to policy.24 For these families are
likely to differ in other ways besides the
number of parents present. 25
Despite the fact that increases in
single parenthood may not be socially
pernicious, prudence would suggest that
in the face of ignorance we should seek
to minimize incentives for single parent-
hood. In any case, most public finance
experts believe that tax and transfer
policy should be designed to be neutral
with respect to behavioral choices.
Income transfer policy is confronted
with the following dilemma. How can
single-parent families be aided more
generously without creating incentives
for the formation of such families? Child
support can help resolve the dilemma. If
the more generous aid to single-parent
families is paid for or financed by the
absent parent, the total incentive for
breaking up a family is reduced. Placing
the cost on the absent parent deters him
from leaving the family, although it does
not directly increase the cost of separa-
tion to the custodial parent.
22. Irwin Garfinkel and Robert Haveman,
Earnings Capacity, Poverty, and Inequality (New
York: Academic Press, 1977), chap. 4.
23. See John Bishop, "Jobs, Cash Transfers,
and Marital Instability: A Review and Synthesis
of the Evidence," Journal of Human Resources,
15: 301-34 (Summer 1980); and Robert Hutchens,
"Welfare, Remarriage, and Marital Search," Amer-
ican Economic Review, 69:369-79 (June 1979).
24. For an excellent review of the literature
and the best study to date, see Sara McLanahan,
"Family Structure and the Reproduction of
Poverty," American Journal of Sociology (in
press).
25. For example, it is possible that bad family
life leads both to divorce and to long-term harm to
the children. In this case the children of single-
parents would be expected to do less well than
children in two-parent families even if being in a




aided by a welfare program?
Strong arguments exist for supple-
menting the incomes of those who are
expected to work through nonwelfare
programs. Since female heads of families
are increasingly expected to work-and
indeed do work-welfare programs are
not the best way to aid them.
The incomes of those expected to
work can be supplemented either by
programs designed only to aid those
with low income-income-tested or wel-
fare programs-or by programs designed
to aid all regardless of income-non-
income-tested programs. AFDC and
Food Stamps are examples of income-
tested programs; children’s allowances
and public education are examples of
non-income-tested programs. First, we
must dispose of the frequently heard
argument that welfare programs are
more efficient than nonwelfare pro-
grams.26 Welfare programs reduce
benefits as income increases, which is
equivalent to taxing income. Compared
to the tax rates they face in welfare
programs, the tax rates that the poor
must pay to finance programs that pro-
vide the same benefits to all-regardless
of income-will be lower. On the other
hand, in order to finance a non-income-
tested program that provides the same
benefits as an income-tested program,
tax rates on the nonpoor must be higher.
So whether income testing is efficient or
not depends upon whether it is more
efficient to place higher tax rates on the
rich or the poor. The limited empirical
evidence available does not support the
claim that income testing is more effi-
cient and, indeed, leans the other way.&dquo;
Equity considerations strengthen the
case for using non-income-tested pro-
grams to aid those expected to work. By
their nature welfare programs impose
tax rates on beneficiaries that are higher
than the tax rates imposed on nonbene-
ficiaries to finance the program. This is
equivalent to imposing a regressive mar-
ginal tax rate structure in our overall
tax-transfer system.
Because the tax rates in our tax-
transfer system are regressive, they pe-
nalize poor people for working to a
greater degree than the tax system pena-
lizes the rest of us. The economic compo-
nent of this is that we reduce the relative
incentive of the poor to work. The moral
component is that we stack the deck
against their making it the way Ameri-
cans are supposed to make it-through
work. The poor have the worst jobs and
get paid the least. If we really want them
to work they should face the lowest, not
the highest, tax rates.
Granted that welfare programs are
not the best way to supplement the
incomes of those expected to work,
should female heads of families be clas-
sified as expected to work? When the
AFDC program was enacted in 1935,
26. See, for example, C.L. Schultze et al.,
Setting National Priorities: The 1973 Budget
(Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1972),
p. 200.
27. Two of the three studies that address the
issue specifically conclude that non-income-tested
programs are more efficient. These two are superior
theoretically to the third, which finds the opposite.
On the other hand, the third is superior in some
dimension in terms of its empirical methodology.
See J. R. Kesselman and Irwin Garfinkel, "Professor
Friedman, Meet Lady Rhys-Williams: NIT vs.
CIT," Journal of Public Economy, 10:179-216 
(1978); Efraim Sadka, Irwin Garfinkel, and Kemper
Moreland, "Income Testing and Social Welfare,"
in Income-Tested Transfer Programs, ed. Gar-
finkel, chap. 8; and David Betson, David Green-
berg, and Richard Kasten, "A Simulation Analysis
of the Economic Efficiency and Distributional
Effects of Alternative Program Structures," in
ibid., chap. 6.
128
women were not expected to work.
Moreover, we were in the midst of the
Great Depression; the program was de-
signed to enable single mothers to stay
home to raise their children. Now that
half of married women with children
work, expectations have changed. A
new consensus is emerging. Single
mothers are increasingly expected to work.
Indeed, in view of the fact that three-
fourths of single mothers do work, the
value judgment required to decide whe-
ther they should be expected to work
may be beside the point.
Summary critique of
the current system
Throughout the country, the current
child support system condones and there-
fore fosters parental irresponsibility. It
is inequitable and therefore exacerbates
tensions between former spouses. And
everywhere the system impoverishes
children.
Parental irresponsibility is evidenced
in the national statistics already pre-
sented. To summarize, less than half of
absent fathers pay any child support.
The child support system is inequi-
table because whether the absent parent
is ordered to pay support, how much he
is ordered to pay, and how much effort
is devoted to forcing him to pay depend
not just on ability to pay, but on the
varying attitudes of local judges, district
attorneys, welfare officials, and the
skills of the parents’ lawyers. Nearly
every absent parent can find someone
earning more who pays less. Nearly
every custodial parent knows someone
who is receiving more from an absent
father who earns less. Because of this
and the absence of firm, determinative
legislative guidelines, child support is a
major source of continuing tension be-
tween many former spouses.
Finally, the widespread failure of the
system to ensure that absent parents pay
child support impoverishes children and
shifts the burden of financial support to
the public sector. Nearly half of all
children living in female-headed house-
holds are poor and on welfare. Yet, as
suggested earlier, in view of the fact that
so many single mothers work, welfare is
no longer the best way to aid children
with single mothers.
CHILD SUPPORT INSURANCE
In view of these problems with the
current child support system, a research
team from the Institute for Research on
Poverty, under contract with the Wis-
consin DHSS, has developed a proposal
for a new child support insurance
system. 29
Under the program all parents who
live apart from their children are liable
for a child support tax. The base for the
tax will be gross income. The rate will be
proportional and depend upon the num-
ber of children owed support. For exam-
ple, the tax rate might be 17 percent for
one child, and 25, 29, 31, 32, and 33
percent for two, three, four, five, and six
or more children, respectively. The child
support tax would be collected through
a wage-withholding system, like payroll
and income taxes. All children with a
living absent parent would be entitled
to a child support benefit equal to either
the child support tax paid by the absent
parent or a socially insured minimum
benefit, whichever is higher. In cases
where the absent parent pays less than
the minimum, the difference would be
financed out of general revenues now
devoted to the AFDC program. Finally,
in cases where the absent parent pays
less than the minimum, the custodial
28. Garfinkel and Melli, Child Support.
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parent would be subject to a surtax up to
the amount of the public subsidy.
A few words about the rationale for
three major features of this new system
are warranted. First, why establish child
support obligations by legislation rather
than judicial discretion? The principal
argument is that because of the large
financial obligation already borne by
the state, the apportionment of support
for poor children among the custodial
parent, the absent parent, and the public
is more appropriately a legislative func-
tion. Moreover, a legislated formula
would reduce inequity. Finally, the use
of courts is too costly to society and the
families affected.
Second, why use general revenues to
supplement inadequate child support
payments from absent parents? Doing
so will insure children against the risk
that their noncustodial parent’s income
declines or is permanently low. It will
also reduce welfare costs and case loads.
Third, why treat child support as a
tax and use the withholding system in all
cases? Because wage withholding is the
most effective collection tool we have,
and effective and efficient collection of
child support is essential.
The new child support benefit tax
program would achieve the objectives of
-assuring that those who parent
children share their income with
them;
-establishing and collecting child
support equitably and efficiently;
-increasing the economic well-being
of children who have a living absent
parent, while
-simultaneously reducing welfare
costs and case loads.
How much would a child support
insurance program cost? And how much
would it reduce poverty and welfare
dependence?
Both the benefits and the costs of a
child support insurance program will
depend upon the level of the minimum
benefit, the tax rates on noncustodial
and custodial parents, and the effective-
ness of child support collections. In
Table 1 estimates of net savings, or
costs, and reductions in poverty and
AFDC case loads are presented for child
support insurance programs with four
different minimum benefit levels. The
minimum benefits for the first child
range from $2000 to $3500. Minimum
benefits for the second, third, fourth,
fifth, and sixth child are equal to $1500,
$1000, $500, $500, and $500, respectively.
The tax rates for noncustodial parents
are 17 percent for one child, 25 percent
for two children, 29 percent for three
children, 31 percent for four children, 32
percent for five children, and 33 percent
for six or more children. Tax rates for
custodial parents are equal to one-half
those for noncustodial parents. The esti-
mates in the top panel of Table 1 assume
100 percent collection effectiveness.
The most striking finding is that if we
collect 100 percent of the noncustodial
parents’ child support obligation, three
of the four child-support insurance pro-
grams would actually save money. That
is, the extra dollars paid out under the
new program would be more than offset
by increased child support collections
and consequent reductions in welfare
expenditures. Even the most generous
plan costs less than a quarter of a billion
dollars.
At the same time, all the programs
would reduce the poverty gap, the dif-
ference between the income of a poor
family and the income the family would
need to reach the poverty line. The
number of families on welfare would be
reduced as well. The reductions in the
poverty gap for families eligible for child
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support are quite large, ranging from a
low of 39 percent to a high of 53 percent.
Similarly, reductions in welfare case
loads are very large, ranging from 48 to
64 percent.29 In short, all of the child
support insurance programs would sub-
stantially reduce poverty and welfare
dependence and three of four would
actually save money.
No matter how efficient the col-
lection system is, less than 100 percent of
potential revenue will be collected. Conse-
quently, the second and third panels in
Table 1 present estimates of the effects
of collecting only 80 percent and 70
percent, respectively, of the noncustodial
parents’ child support obligation. If we
collected only 80 percent of potential
revenue, the $2500 minimum benefit
plan would still save $0.59 billion. But
the $3000 minimum benefit plan instead
of saving $0.87 billion-as with 100
percent collection-costs an additional
$0.33 billion. If we collect only 70 per-
cent of potential revenue, both plans
TAB LE 1
ESTIMATED COSTS OR SAVINGS AND EFFECTS ON POVERTY
AND AID TO FAMILIES WITH DEPENDENT CHILDREN (AFDC) CASE LOADS
OF ALTERNATIVE CHILD SUPPORT INSURANCE PROGRAMS IN 1983 DOLLARS
NOTE: The estimates are derived from the &dquo;1979 Current Population Survey-Child Support
Supplement&dquo; (CPS-CSS). The CPS-CSS is a match file that contains data from both the March
annual demographic and income survey and the April 1979 child support supplement. On the
basis of the March survey 3547 women who were eligible to receive child support were identified
and interviewed in April. In order to estimate savings or costs and reductions in poverty and AFDC
case loads, it was necessary to impute noncustodial parent incomes. Estimates of the noncustodial
fathers’ income are derived from regressions relating wives’ characteristics to husbands’ incomes.
For a more detailed description of the data and methodology, see Donald Oellerich and Irwin
Garfinkel, &dquo;Distributional Impacts of Existing and Alternative Child Support Systems,&dquo; Policy
Studies Journal, 12(l): 1 19-29 (Sept. 1983).
29. Actually, the welfare case-load reductions
are too high because they are based on annual data
whereas eligibility is based on monthly income.
On the other hand, they are too low because they
do not take account of the increases in work that
would result from the improved incentives of a
child support insurance program.
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cost more, although the extra cost of the
$2500 plan is very small. Note also that
collecting less than 100 percent of the
noncustodial parent obligation also re-
duces the effectiveness of a child support
insurance program in reducing poverty
and welfare dependence. These effects
are not so large as the effect on costs,
however, because for poor families the
minimum benefit makes up for most of
the loss in private child support.
WHITHER THE FUTURE?
In summer 1984 the Congress voted
unanimously to enact the strongest fed-
eral child support legislation to date.
The legislation requires all states to (1)
initiate a process to withhold child sup-
port from the wages of noncustodial
parents who are delinquent in their child
support payments for one month; and
(2) appoint blue-ribbon commissions to
devise statewide standards for child sup-
port. In addition, for the first time the
law gives financial incentives for states
to collect child support for non-AFDC
cases and out-of-state cases. The provi-
sions for wage withholding and state-
wide standards move the country in the
direction of the child support insurance
proposal. But withholding in response
to delinquency is not likely to be nearly
as effective as universal withholding.
Does anyone imagine that income and
payroll tax collections would be as high
if we withheld them only for delinquents?
Similarly because the statewide stand-
ards will not be binding upon-and
therefore can be ignored by-local
judges, they will be less effective than
legislated standards.
The state of Wisconsin is currently
conducting a demonstration to evaluate
a child support insurance program. Cur-
rently 10 counties are using income
withholding in all new cases. The state
Department of Health and Social Ser-
vices at the direction of the state legisla-
ture has published a child support stand-
ard with withholding rates of 17 percent
for one child, 25 percent for two chil-
dren, and so on, which judges may but
are not required to use in determining
the support obligation. Finally, the 1984
federal child support legislation contains
a provision that gives Wisconsin author-
ity to use AFDC funds to help finance
the minimum benefit in the child support
insurance demonstration. Intensive plan-
ning for conducting the benefit side of
the demonstration is now under way
and implementation is scheduled for
early 1987.
The contrast between the dismal real-
ity of the current child support system
and the bright promise of a child support
insurance system warrants experimenta-
tion with the latter. Whether a child
support insurance program will be as
attractive in practice, of course, remains
to be seen.
